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1 Introduction
Understanding strategic choice has become a key goal of modern economics. Over the last
half century a large body of theoretical work has been developed in this area. More recently,
experimental work has begun to illuminate the various behavioral tendencies of real strategic
agents. Here we develop techniques designed to divine the underlying “program” that directs
individual strategic behavior in repeated games. By capturing the computation inherent in
actual strategic decision making, we should be able to improve our predictions of social
system behavior, as well as provide new empirical and theoretical insights.
The Bayesian inference technique we develop here allows us to draw inferences from choice
data regarding the number and characteristics of repeated-game strategies in a population of
experimental subjects. Our ‘machine”-based repeated-game strategy model is based on ﬁnite
automata, which capture the computation inherent in strategic choice and represent a rich
class of behavior for systems that rely on ﬁnite inputs and outputs. Our goal is to develop an
empirically based model of the set of strategies that people actually use in repeated games.
Since our procedure is applicable to a much wider class of games than we investigate here,
it will open the door for researchers to supplement common tests of behavioral conformance
to theories with deeper investigation of the strategic heterogeneity behind observed choices
in many economically interesting contexts.
The econometric model is based on ﬁnite state machines. We make the model stochastic
by making action probabilities, but not state transitions, random. The number of machines,
their probabilities in the population, numbers of machine states, state transition functions
and action probabilities (by machine state) are all variable: using repeated game data from
the laboratory, we obtain the joint posterior distribution of all these unknown quantities.
Following a large literature on data augmentation, introduced to the statistics literature by
Tanner and Wong (1987), we add the function mapping experimental subjects to machines
to the list of unknown quantities. Doing this simpliﬁes posterior simulation greatly. In
1
particular, it allows us to integrate out action probabilities, an enormous computational
advantage. It also provides us with the posterior distribution (jointly with other unknowns)
of the machine assignments, which is useful in its own right. Conditional simulation of
transition functions is based partly on a new Metropolis-Hastings proposal that stochastically
builds a state transition function based on the tree of supergame play generated by the
subjects assigned to a given machine type. We introduce a useful way of identifying machines
in a population using a labelling technique.
We apply our technique to a choice data set from a series of experiments in which human
subjects play a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. We use this data set to attempt to uncover
the strategies driving human behavior in such a context. The results give us a new picture of
play in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. We ﬁnd strong evidence for heterogeneity. We
ﬁnd evidence that people use strategies that punish and reward behavior of the opponent.
Interestingly, the strategies we infer do not contain harsh enough punishments to support
cooperation in equilibrium.
Our procedure is closely related to the early work on identifying subject heterogeneity in
experiments by El-Gamal and Grether (1995), who used a Bayesian procedure to estimate
decision rules in a population of subjects faced with a static, individual choice task. Their
goal was to discover whether or not people are Bayesian, and they did this convincingly by
assuming a functional form for the decision rule and using their Bayesian technique to draw
inference regarding the number and types of rules that generated their data. By contrast,
our application is to repeated-game strategies, which requires both a very diﬀerent strategy
model and computational technique for inference.1
Houser, Keane, and McCabe (2004) provide a method to draw inference regarding the
number and types of decision rules in a population of subjects playing a dynamic game.
1 Other probabilistic choice models include Stahl and Wilson (1995) study heterogeneity in levels of
reasoning in games solvable through iterated dominance specifying both the form and number of decision
rules, and McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), who introduce Quantal Response Equilibrium, which makes it
possible to study subject behavior in deviation from optimality (though not subject heterogeneity).
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They estimate a polynomial approximation of the value function (that is, the expected value
of future payoﬀs) in state variables similar to Geweke and Keane (1999, 2001), allowing
individual decision rules to diﬀer by the parameters in their value functions. They illustrate
their technique with a game that subjects play against nature based on a model of school
choice, and ﬁnd evidence for a few interesting behavioral types. This approach is very
ﬂexible because the researcher does not have to specify a priori the functional form of
the decision rules. One simulates the rules to interpret the behavior. Our application gains
some eﬃciency (at the cost of ﬂexibility) by specifying a strategy model. Our strategy model,
however, is general for a rather wide class of multi-player games, covering strategies predicted
by theory and simpler rules of thumb, and in the end, we are interested in characterizing the
strategies.2
One can also address the question of strategy types through experimental design. Exper-
imental economists have, for example, attempted to elicit strategies directly from subjects
(see, for example, Selten et al. (1997)). Others identify strategies by tracking the manner in
which subjects collect and process information, as was done by Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and
Broseta (2001), and Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2001). Other alternatives include
various experimental manipulations and the use of protocol responses. While all of these
techniques can provide insight into strategic choice, they may be limited to particular games,
require self-reports of behavior, or costly experimental design. As such they are important
complements to the larger quest of understanding actual strategic behavior.
2 Houser, Keane, and McCabe note that the two types of procedures can be complementary: one could
use their procedure to identify subject types and then the El-Gamal and Grether procedure to describe the
decision rules, and the same holds true for our procedure.
3
2 Games and Machines
Here we provide some formal deﬁnitions, and examples, that will provide the needed frame-
work for the work that follows. We consider a world in which agents play a repeated stage
game. We call a single instance of a repeated stage game a supergame. An agent’s repeated-
game strategy is embodied by a machine (a stochastic automaton), a representation that
provides a compact description of a broad swath of potential strategies. We assume that
each agent has access to a heterogeneous collection of such machines, and randomly chooses
one machine when called upon to play.
Agents repeatedly play a stage game, γ, deﬁned by the triple (N,A, (ui)i∈N). The set of
players is given by N . For each player i ∈ N , they have a set Ai of potential actions. Let
A = ×i∈NAi give the action proﬁle set (the set of potential actions) and let a = (ai)i∈N ∈ A
give the action proﬁle (the set of actual actions chosen by each player during the stage game).
The payoﬀ function for each player i ∈ N , is given by ui : A → . For example, a Prisoner’s
Dilemma stage game has N = {1, 2}, A = A1 × A2 = {d, c} × {D,C} (where, we use
lower case to indicate the actions of Player 1), and u1(d,D) = u2(d,D) = P (punishment),
u1(c,D) = u2(d, C) = S (sucker), u1(d, C) = u2(c,D) = T (temptation), and u1(c, C) =
u2(c, C) = R (reward).
Agents employ machines—represented by stochastic automata—to implement a given
strategy. Aumann (1981) suggested that such machines would be a useful way to represent
game strategies in economics. Automata model systems that generate discrete outputs in
response to discrete inputs, and as such they represent a fundamental class of systems.
Automata have been used to explore bounded rationality in repeated games (e.g., Rubinstein,
1986), evolutionary games (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992), and learning (Miller, 1996).3
3 Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2003) use deterministic ﬁnite automata to describe play in an indeﬁnitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Aoyagi and Frechette (2004) ﬁt ﬁnite automata with transitions determined by
thresholds to data in an indeﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with imperfect monitoring; in their
model heterogeneity is characterized by the level of the threshold, not the structure of the machine.
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We deﬁne a machine, by the quadruple (Q, λ, µ, q). Each machine has a non-empty and
ﬁnite set of states, Q. One of these states, qs ∈ Q, is the initial state. In any given state,
the machine takes an action given by an action probability mass function, µ : Ai × Q → .
Thus, if the machine is in state q ∈ Q, it plays ai ∈ Ai with probability µ(ai; q). We deﬁne a
(deterministic) state transition function for each state of the machine, λ : A×Q → Q, that
maps the current action proﬁle and state of the machine to the next state that the machine
will enter. Thus, if the action proﬁle is a ∈ A and the machine is in state q ∈ Q, then the
machine will enter state λ(a; q).
The following two examples illustrate the above ideas. First, we illustrate a machine that
implements an “85% grim trigger” strategy in the Prisoner’s Dilemma:
m11 = (Q
1
1, λ
1
1, µ
1
1, q
1
1), Q
1
1 = {1, 2}, q = 1
λ((d,D), 1) = λ((c,D), 1) = 2, λ((d, C), 1) = λ((c, C), 1) = 1
λ((d,D), 1) = λ((c,D), 1) = λ((d, C), 2) = λ((c, C), 2) = 2
µ(d; 1) = 0.15, µ(c; 1) = 0.85, µ(d; 2) = 0.85, µ(c; 2) = 0.15.
If this machine is in State 1, if the opponent plays C (that is, action proﬁles (c, C) and
(d, C)) the machine will remain in State 1, and if the opponent plays D (action proﬁles
(c,D) and (d,D)) the machine will move to State 2, and so on. Thus, this machine begins
by playing c with probability 0.85 and continues to do so as long as the opponent is observed
to cooperate. If the opponent ever defects, the machine switches to State 2 for the remainder
of the game and plays d with probability 0.85.
Second, we present an “85% tit-for-tat” machine:
m21 = (Q
2
1, λ
2
1, µ
2
1, q
2
1), Q
2
1 = {1, 2}, q = 1
λ((d,D), 1) = λ((c,D), 1) = 2, λ((d, C), 1) = λ((c, C), 1) = 1
λ((d,D), 1) = λ((c,D), 1) = 2, λ((d, C), 2) = λ((c, C), 2) = 1
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µ(d; 1) = 0.15, µ(c; 1) = 0.85, µ(d; 2) = 0.85, µ(c; 2) = 0.15.
This machine diﬀers from grim solely through a modiﬁcation of the transition function in
State 2, whereby if the opponent cooperates the machine reenters State 1. Thus, this machine
behaves very much like a traditional Tit-For-Tat except that it always has a slight chance
(15%) of taking the opposite of the “traditional” action.
To complete the framework we combine the above ideas. For a given game, with stage
game γ, we assign each player i ∈ N a machine, mi = (Qi, λi, µi, qi). We call such an
assignment a machine proﬁle and can imagine that these N machines repeatedly play the
stage game against one another.
We assume that the machine, mi, chosen by a player is the result of a random draw from
a heterogeneous population of machines. Precisely, a population for player i ∈ N is given by
the triple (Ki, πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i , q
k
i )k∈Ki), where Ki is a set of machine types and πi : Ki → 
is a machine probability mass function giving the probability with which each machine is
selected. For example, we could have a population of players that with, say, probability
0.50 plays 85% Grim Trigger and with probability 0.50 plays 85% Tit-For-Tat. A population
proﬁle is an assignment to each player type of a machine population. This is useful to think
about in asymmetric games where players of diﬀerent types play diﬀerent roles, and thus
may use diﬀerent strategy sets. We can think of drawing a machine from each of the N
populations, and having the resulting machines repeatedly play the stage game.
3 Data and Inference
In this section we describe how to draw inferences about unknown populations and the
assignment of subjets to machines, given observed behavior in repeated games. Our goal
is to be able to numerically approximate functions of posterior expectations of functions of
these unknown quantities, including
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• the posterior probability that one machine accounts for more than 50% of the popula-
tion,
• the posterior mean and variance of the number of machine states of the machine used
by a random subject,
• the same for a particular subject,
• the probability that some machine in the population has an absorbing state,
• the posterior mean and variance of the probability that a random subject cooperates
on her ﬁrst move, and
• the posterior probability that subjects s and s′ use the same machine.
We accomplish this goal by simulating, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques, a
Markov chain on the space of the unknown quantities. The chain is ergodic and its unique
invariant distribution is the posterior distribution of the unknown quantities, so Birkhoﬀ’s
ergodic theorem implies that sample moments of the simulated chain converge almost surely
to their respective population moments, as long as the latter exist. We ﬁrst introduce
notation for the relevant observed and unknown quantities, as well as for a latent variable
representing the assignment of subjects to machines. We then give distributions for the
observed data given unknown quantities, both conditional and unconditional on the latent
machine assignments. Next, we complete the statistical model for unknown and observed
quantities by providing prior distributions for the unknown quantities. After deriving some
useful conditional posterior distributions, we describe algorithms for posterior simulation.
After discussing the identiﬁcation of machine types, we describe how to do draw inference
on the number of machine types in a population.
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3.1 Quantities
Observed data
A convenient unit of observation is the supergame, which consists of a duration T , deter-
mined stochastically as part of the experimental design, and a sequence of T action proﬁles,
representing choice sequences recorded in the laboratory. A supergame realization for a stage
game (N,A, (ui)i∈N ) is a pair σ = (T, (a1, . . . , aT )), where positive integer T is a number
of periods and (a1, . . . , aT ) is an observed action proﬁle sequence. For each t ∈ {1, . . . , T},
action proﬁle at = (ati)i∈N ∈ A.
In an experiment, there are a number of subjects, each of whom plays a number of
supergames. For each player, we have a set of subjects, whom we track through all the
supergames they play. Since we ignore learning in this paper, we represent the supergame
realizations played by a subject as a set rather than an ordered tuple. An experiment
realization is a (Si, (Rs, (σ
r
s)r∈Rs)s∈Si)i∈N , where for each i ∈ N , Si is a set of subjects
playing as player i, Rs is a set of indices to supergame realizations involving subject s and
σrs = (T
r, (ar1, . . . , a
r
T r)) is a supergame realization involving subject s.
The observed data consists of an experiment realization e ≡ (ei)i∈N ≡ (Si, (Rs, (σrs)r∈Rs)s∈Si)i∈N .
Since the Si, the Rs and the T
r are part of the experimental design, we condition on these
values throughout and suppress notation for this conditioning. When we treat e as a random
variable below, we consider the action proﬁles to be random and the rest to be constant.
Unknown quantities
The unknown quantity that we are trying to learn about is the population proﬁle (pi)i∈N =
(Ki, πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i , q
k
i )k∈K)i∈N . For convenience and without loss of generality we assume
hereafter that A = {1, . . . , |A|} and that for every i ∈ N and k ∈ Ki, Qki = {1, . . . , |Qki |}.
We use the | · | notation for the cardinality of a set.
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In a inferential context, two issues arise over the initial states qki and state transition
functions λki . First, any permutation of states gives an observationally equivalent combina-
tion of initial state and transition function. Second, if some states are unreachable from the
initial state, the transition function is observationally equivalent to a transition function for
a smaller state set.
We resolve these issues by selecting one combination of initial state and transition function
from each equivalence class to represent the class. We will assign positive probability to the
chosen combination, and zero probability to the other elements of its class. We choose the
initial state qki to be the ﬁrst state. We form a list of the values λ
k
i (a, q) in q-ﬁrst lexicographic
order and insist that each q > 1 appears in the list before the ﬁrst occurence of each q ′ > q.
We also insist that all states are reachable. More precisely, for all i ∈ N and k ∈ Ki, we
choose the qki and λ
k
i that satisfy the following three conditions.
1. (order of initial state) qki = 1,
2. (order of non-initial states) for every a, a′ ∈ A and every q, q′ ∈ Qki \{1} such that
(q′ < q) or (q′ = q) ∧ (a′ < a),
λki (a, q) ≤ λki (a′, q′) + 1,
3. (no unreachable states) for every a ∈ A and every q ∈ Qki \{1}, there exists a q′ ∈ Qki
and a′ ∈ A such that q′ < q and λki (a′, q′) = q.
Having set all the qki equal to one, we suppress notation for initial states. We will call a state
transition function λ regular if it satisﬁes conditions 2 and 3, and denote by Λ(A,Q) the set
of regular state transition functions on A×Q.
We will use the following notational shortcuts.
K ≡ (Ki)i∈N π ≡ (πi)i∈N Q ≡ ((Qki )k∈Ki)i∈N
λ ≡ ((λki )k∈Ki)i∈N µ ≡ ((µki )k∈Ki)i∈N p ≡ (K,π,Q,λ,µ)
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We augment the data by adding a latent variable representing machine assignments. For
each i ∈ N , let machine assignment function φi : Si → Ki be the function assigning subjects
to machine types. Let φ = (φi)i∈N . In Section 3.5, we will describe how to simulate the
joint posterior distribution of machine assignments and other unknowns. Augmenting the
data in this way simpliﬁes posterior simulation enormously, and the posterior distribution
of machine assignments is interesting in its own right.
3.2 Data distributions
We assume that for each player i ∈ N , the actions of each subject s ∈ Si in all the supergames
(σrs)r∈Rs are generated by one of the machines of population pi. Machine assignments are
independant across subjects, and governed by the machine probability mass function πi.
The data distribution e|p is given by the probability mass function
f(e|p) =
∏
i∈N
∏
s∈Si
∑
k∈Ki
πi(k)
∏
r∈Rs
T r∏
t=1
µki (a
r
ti; q(a
r
1, . . . , a
r
t−1;λ
k
i ),
where q(a1, . . . , at−1;λki ) is the state that machine with initial state 1 and transition function
λki will be in at period t, after the observed action proﬁle sequence (a1, . . . , at−1). That is,
q(a1, . . . , at−1;λki ) ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
qki t = 1
λki (at−1, q
k
i,t−1(a1, . . . , at−2)) t = 2, . . . , T.
(1)
The joint distribution e,φ|p of data and machine assignments given unknown parameters
is given by the distributions e|φ,p and φ|p, with probability mass functions
f(e|φ,p) =
∏
i∈N
∏
s∈Si
∏
r∈Rs
T r∏
t=1
µ
φi(s)
i (a
r
ti; q(a
r
1, . . . , a
r
t−1, λ
φi(s)
i ))
and
f(φ|p) =
∏
i∈N
∏
s∈Si
∑
k∈Ki
πi(φi(s))).
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3.3 Prior Distributions
We complete the model by providing a prior distribution for p. Populations in a population
proﬁle are independant and machines in a population are i.i.d. We leave the priors on the
number of machines in a population and the number of machine states of a machine for the
user to specify. These quantities are thought to be small positive integers, so this ﬂexibility
does not come with a signiﬁcant burden. The prior on the transition functions is uniform
on the set of regular transition functions.
The priors on the machine probability mass functions πi and the action probability mass
functions µki are both Dirichlet. Dirichlet distributions are commonly used as distributions
over discrete distributions. In order to treat machines in populations and actions in action
sets symmetrically, we impose exchangeability of machine probabilities and action probabil-
ities, which reduces the number of parameters of each Dirichlet distribution to one.
The choice of the Dirichlet distribution for action probabilities allows us to integrate out
all the action probabilities from the posterior distribution, an enormous computational ad-
vantage. The user chooses a single parameter ν for this distribution, which has a meaningful
interpretation, discussed below.
We now give details on the prior distribution for p. It has the following conditional
independance structure:
f(K,π,Q,λ,µ) = f(K) · f(π|K) · f(Q|K) · f(λ|K,Q) · f(µ|K,Q).
Distribution K
The numbers |Ki| of machine states are i.i.d. across players i, with probability masses
ωk ≡ Pr[|Ki| = k], k = 1, . . . ,∞. Thus the probability mass function for K is given by
f(K) =
∏
i∈N
f(Ki) =
∏
i∈N
ω|Ki|.
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The |Ki| are thought to be small numbers, and we recommend truncating the prior to a
small set, such as {1, 2, 3} or {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Distribution π|K
The machine probability mass functions πi are independent, with each πi distributed as a
Dirichlet random variable with |Ki| parameters, all equal to α. Thus the density for π|K is
given by
f(π|K) =
∏
i∈N
f((πi(k))k∈Ki|Ki) =
∏
i∈N
Γ(α · |Ki|))
[Γ(α)]|Ki|
∏
k∈Ki
[πi(k)]
α−1.
The choice of α determines how close to zero or one machine probabilities are likely to be.
For α = 1, the density is uniform on the |Ki|-dimensional simplex. Values α > 1 favor more
moderate machine probabilities such as (πi(0), πi(1), πi(2)) = (0.4, 0.3, 0.3). Values α ∈ (0, 1)
favor more extreme machine probabilities such as (πi(0), πi(1), πi(2)) = (0.9, 0.04, 0.06).
Distribution Q|K
The sets Qki of machine states are i.i.d. across machines k and players i, with the cardinality
of each Qki governed by the probability masses θQ ≡ Pr[|Qki | = Q], Q = 1, . . . ,∞. Thus the
probability mass function for Q|K is
f(Q|K) =
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
f(Qki ) =
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
θ|Qki |.
The |Qki | are thought to be small numbers, and we recommend truncating the prior to a
small set, such as {1, 2, 3} or {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Distribution λ|K,Q
Given K and Q, the state transition functions λki are independant across players i and
machine types k, with a uniform distribution over the set Λ(A,Qki ) of regular transition
functions λ : A×Qki → Qki .
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Thus the probability mass function for λ|K,Q is
f(λ|K,Q) =
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
f(λki |Qki ) =
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
1
n(|A|, |Qki |)
,
where n(|A|, |Q|) is the number of regular state transition functions λ : A×Q → Q.
We now derive a expression for n(|A|, |Q|). We ﬁrst derive a recursive expression for the
number n¯(|A|, |Q|) of maps λ : A × Q → Q statisfying condition 2 (no unreachable states)
but not necessarily condition 3 (order of non-initial states).
The total number of maps λ : A×Q → Q is |Q||A||Q|. The number of maps with exactly
m unreachable states is ⎛
⎝|Q| − 1
m
⎞
⎠ · n¯(|A|, |Q| −m) · |Q|m|A|
The ﬁrst factor gives the number of choices of m unreachable states out of |Q|−1 non-initial
states. The second factor gives the number of maps on the |Q| −m reachable states where
all states are indeed reachable. The third factor gives the number of maps A × Q∗ → Q,
where Q∗ is a set of m unreachable states. For |Q| = 1, the total number of maps is 1, and
for this map, all states are reachable. Therefore n¯(|A|, 1) = 1. For |Q| > 1, we can calculate
recursively
n¯(|A|, |Q|) = |Q||A||Q| −
|Q|−1∑
m=1
⎛
⎝|Q| − 1
m
⎞
⎠ · n¯(A, |Q| −m) · |Q|m|A|.
We now obtain n(|A|, |Q|) by dividing by the number of permutations of the non-initial
states:
n(|A|, |Q|) = n¯(|A|, |Q|)|Q− 1|! .
Distribution µ|K,Q
Given K and Q, the action probability mass functions µki (·; q) are independant across players
i, machine types k and machine states q ∈ Qki , with each distributed as a Dirichlet random
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variable with |Qki | parameters, all equal to ν. Thus the density for µ|K,Q is
f(µ|K,Q) =
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
∏
q∈Qki
f((µki (ai; q))ai∈Ai|Qki )
=
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
∏
q∈Qki
Γ(ν|Ai|)
[Γ(ν)]|Ai|
∏
ai∈Ai
[µki (ai; q)]
ν−1.
The choice of ν determines how close to zero or one action probabilities are likely to be.
For ν = 1, the density is uniform on the |Ai|-dimensional simplex. Values ν > 1 favor
more moderate action probabilities such as (µki (C), µ
k
i (D)) = (0.6, 0.4). Values ν ∈ (0, 1)
favor more extreme action probabilities such as (µki (C), µ
k
i (D)) = (0.1, 0.9). The choice of ν
expresses the user’s belief about how close machines are to deterministic machines.
3.4 Conditional Posterior Distributions
In this section we derive some posterior distributions that will be useful for posterior sim-
ulation. The derivations are straighforward once we know the following property of the
Dirichlet and multinomial distributions. If θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) is Dirichlet with parameter
α = (α1, . . . , αn) and c|θ = (c1, . . . , cn)|θ is multinomial with parameters θ and
∑n
j=1 cj,
then θ|c is Dirichlet with parameter (α1+ c1, . . . , αn + cn) and the marginal probability mass
function for c is
f(c) =
∏n
j=1 Γ(αj)
Γ(
∑n
j=1 αj)
· Γ(
∑n
j=1 αj + cj)∏n
j=1 Γ(αj + cj)
.
The fact that the prior and data densities both factor by player implies that the posterior
does as well, which simpliﬁes aﬀairs greatly.
Distribution π|K,Q,λ,µ,φ, e
The machine probability mass functions πi are conditionally independent, with each πi dis-
tributed as a Dirichlet random variable with parameters (α+dki (φi))k∈Ki, where the machine
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counts dki (φi) are given by
4
dki (φi) ≡
∑
s∈Si
δk,φi(s) k ∈ Ki, i ∈ N. (2)
That is, the conditional posterior density for π is
f(π|K,Q,λ,µ,φ, e) =
∏
i∈N
f(πi|Ki, φi) (3)
=
∏
i∈N
Γ(
∑
k∈Ki α + d
k
i (φi))∏
k∈Ki Γ(α + d
k
i (φi))
∏
k∈Ki
[πi(k)]
α+dki (φi)−1.
Distribution µ|K,π,Q,λ,φ, e
The action probability mass functions µki (·; q) are independant across players i, machine types
k and machine states q ∈ Qki , with each (µki (ai, q))ai∈Ai distributed as a Dirichlet random
variable with parameters (ν + cki (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))ai∈Ai , where the action counts c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi)
are given by (recall equation (1) deﬁning q(·))
cki (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi) =
∑
s∈{Si : φi(s)=k}
∑
r∈Rs
T r∑
t=1
δq,q(ar1,...,art−1,λki )δai,a
r
ti
, (4)
ai ∈ Ai, q ∈ Qki , k ∈ Ki, i ∈ N.
That is, the posterior density for µ is given by
f(µ|K,π,Q,λ,φ, e)
=
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
∏
q∈Qki
f((µki (ai; q))ai∈Ai|Qki , λki , φi, e) (5)
=
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
∏
q∈Qki
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν + c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν + c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))
∏
ai∈Ai
[µki (ai; q)]
ν+cki (ai,q;λ
k
i ,φi)−1.
4δ is the Kronecker delta function. For integers i and j, δij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise.
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Distribution Q,λ|K,π,φ, e
We can marginalize out µ in e,µ|K,π,Q,λ,φ, given by e|K,π,Q,λ,µ,φ and µ|K,Q, to
obtain the probability mass function
f(e|K,π,Q,λ,φ) =
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
∏
q∈Qki
[Γ(ν)]|Ai|
Γ(ν|Ai|) ·
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν + c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν + c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))
. (6)
The pairs (Qki , λ
k
i ) of machine state set Q
k
i , and state transition function λ
k
i are condi-
tionally independant across players i and machine types k. The posterior probability mass
function for Q,λ|K,π,φ, e is
f(Q,λ|K,π,φ, e)
=
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
f(Qki , λ
k
i |φi, ei) (7)
∝
∏
i∈N
∏
k∈Ki
θ|Qki |
n(|A|, |Qki |)
· [Γ(ν)]
|Ai||Qki |
[Γ(ν|Ai|)]|Qki |
∏
q∈Qki
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν + c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν + c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))
.
Distribution φ|p, e
The machine assignments φi(s) are conditionally independant across players i and subjects
s. The posterior probability mass function for φ is
f(φ|p, e) =
∏
i∈N
∏
s∈Si
f(φi(s)|πi, (Qki , µki , λki )k∈Ki , e) (8)
=
∏
i∈N
∏
s∈Si
πi(k)
∏
r∈Rs
∏T r
t=1 µ
k
i (a
r
ti; q
k
it(a
r
1, . . . , a
r
t−1))∑
κ∈Ki πi(κ)
∏
r∈Rs
∏T r
t=1 µ
κ
i (a
r
ti; q
κ
it(a
r
1, . . . , a
r
t−1))
.
3.5 Posterior Simulation
Since both the prior and the posterior factor by player, the |N | populations are a priori
and a posteriori independent, and we can independently simulate the unknown quantities
for each player i. We now ﬁx i ∈ N arbitrarily.
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Here we will condition on Ki and describe how to simulate the distribution πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki, ei.
Later, in Section 3.7, we discuss how to use a method for computing marginal likelihoods to
obtain f(Ki|ei).
We describe seven diﬀerent parameter update blocks, each of which stochastically updates
one or more of the unknown quantities, conditioning only on the current values of other
unknown quantities. We can chain together any number of these blocks (repetitions are
allowed) to form a sweep. The sweep in thus a stochastic update of the vector of unknown
quantities conditioning only on the current value of the vector. It therefore deﬁnes a Markov
transition kernel. Under conditions described below, we obtain an ergodic Markov chain
whose invariant distribution is the posterior distribution πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki, ei, and
therefore we can use the chain to simulate the posterior.
Two blocks preserve the distribution πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki, ei. Block Bπ updates the
machine probability mass function πi and block Bφ updates the machine assignment function
φi.
Four blocks preserve the marginal distribution πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki, ei. Blocks BQ,λ(k)
and B′Q,λ(k) update, for the given k ∈ Ki, the machine state set Qki and the state transition
function λki . Block Bλ(k) updates, for the given k ∈ Ki, the state transition function λki .
Block B′φ updates the machine assignment function φi.
Finally, block Bµ(k) draws, for the given k ∈ Ki, the action probability mass func-
tion µki from the distribution µ
k
i |Ki, πi, (Qki , λki )k∈Ki, φi, ei. In this way, a block preserv-
ing πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki, ei followed by a Bµ(k) block together preserve the distribution
πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei.
A sweep is a sequence of blocks, with possible repetitions. If a sweep satisﬁes the following
conditions:
1. It includes Bπ and Bφ and for each k ∈ Ki, Bµ(k) and one of BQ,λ or B′Q,λ.
2. A block preserving πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i )k∈Ki, φi|Ki, ei cannot be followed by a block preserving
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πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki, ei.
3. The last block of the sweep must either be a Bµ(k) block or preserve πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki, ei.
then the Markov transition kernel is ergodic and its unique invariant distribution is πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki
Then Birkhoﬀ’s ergodic theorem implies that posterior simulation sample moments converge
almost surely to posterior population moments whenever the latter exist.
The fact that πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei is an invariant distribution of the Markov transi-
tion kernel follows from Conditions 2 and 3. All blocks required by Condition 1 have updates
whose support is the same as the support of the appropriate conditional distribution, and
together they update the entire parameter vector. The chain is therefore Harris recurrent
and aperiodic. This in turn implies that the chain is ergodic and has a unique invariant
distribution.
We now describe in detail the various blocks.
Blocks preserving πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki, ei
By (3), the distribution πi|Ki, (Qki , λki , µki )k∈Ki is Dirichlet. Block Bπ draws πi directly from
this distribution using standard procedures.
By (8), the probability mass function for φi|Ki, (Qki , λki , µki )k∈Ki is a product of |Si| prob-
ability mass functions, each of which has only |Ki| mass points. Block Bφ draws φi directly
from this distribution using standard procedures.
Blocks preserving πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki, ei
Block B′φ is a random walk Metropolis update which proposes a φ
∗
i identical to φi except
for a random mutation and adopts the proposal with a certain probability. The proposal
consists of drawing a random subject s∗ from the uniform distribution on Si, then drawing
φ∗i (s
∗) from the uniform distribution on Ki\φi(s∗). For all s ∈ Si\{s∗}, we set φ∗i (s) = φi(s).
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The proposal is a random walk on the space of machine assignments. We accept the proposal
φ∗i with probability
min
[
1,
πi(k
∗)
πi(k)
· B(k, φ
∗
i )
B(k, φi)
· B(k
∗, φ∗i )
B(k∗, φi)
]
,
where k = φi(s), k
∗ = φ∗i (s), and for all k ∈ Ki and all machine assignment functions
φi : Si → Ki,
B(k, φi) ≡
∏
q∈Qki
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν + c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν + c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))
.
Acceptance means we move to the proposed state, replacing φi with φ
∗
i . If we do not accept,
φi remains unchanged.
For given k ∈ Ki, block BQ,λ is an independance Metropolis Hastings update with the
prior distribution f(Qki , λ
k
i ) as the proposal distribution. This involves the following steps.
We ﬁrst draw the proposal Qk∗i , λ
k∗
i from the joint prior distribution of Q
k
i and λi. We then
accept with probability
min
⎡
⎢⎣1, θQki
θQk∗i
· [Γ(ν)]
|Ai|(|Qk∗i |−|Qki |)
[Γ(ν|Ai|)]|Qk∗i |−|Qki |
·
∏
q∈Qk∗i
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν+c
k∗
i (ai,q;λ
k∗
i ,φi))
∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν+c
k∗
i (ai,q;λ
k∗
i ,φi))∏
q∈Qki
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν+c
k
i (ai,q;λ
k
i ,φi))
∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν+c
k
i (ai,q;λ
k
i ,φi))
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Acceptance means we move to the proposed state, replacing Qki and λ
k
i with Q
k∗
i and λ
k∗
i . If
we do not accept, λki remains unchanged.
Block B′λ,Q is also an independance Metropolis-Hastings update, but features a proposal
distribution more closely resembling the posterior distribution Qki , λ
k
i |Ki, φki , ei.
Denote by Qk∗i , λ
k∗
i the proposal. Q
k∗
i is drawn from the prior distribution for Q
k
i :
f(Qk∗i |Ki, φi, ei) = θ|Qk∗i |.
We construct λk∗i stochastically, one value λ
k∗
i (a, q) at a time. To establish an order for these
values, we introduce a lexicographic order on A×N. It is useful to think of N as an extention
of Qk∗i . For all a, a
′ ∈ A and q, q′ ∈ N,
(a, q) > (a′, q′) iﬀ (q > q′) or (q = q′ ∧ a > a′).
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We also introduce some convenient related notation. For all a ∈ A and q ∈ N, we denote by
(a, q)+ the successor of (a, q) and by (a, q)− its predecessor.
After each successive draw of a value λki (a, q), we have a “history” L(a, q) of drawn values:
L(a, q) ≡ (λ(a′, q′))(a′,q′)≤(a,q).
We now introduce a measure of how well an incomplete transition function, given by history
L(a, q), ﬁts the data. We ﬁrst describe an inﬁnite state machine which agrees with the
incomplete transition function for values up to and including λ(a, q), but otherwise has no
recurrent states. The initial state is 1 and the transition function λ¯L(a,q) : A×N→ N is given
by
λ¯L(a,q)(a
′, q′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
λki (a
′, q′) (a′, q′) ≤ (a, q)
|Qk∗i |+ 1 (a′, q′) = (a, q)+
λki ((a
′, q′)−) + 1 (a′, q′) > (a, q)+
.
We now consider the question of ﬁt. Recalling (6), the probability mass function of the data
eki attributable to subjects of player i assigned to machine k ∈ Ki, given the state set Qki ,
transition function λki and machine assignment function φi, but with action probabilities µ
k
i
marginalized out, is
f(eki |Qki , λki , φi) =
∏
q∈Qki
[Γ(ν)]|Ai|
Γ(ν|Ai|) ·
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν + c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν + c
k
i (ai, q;λ
k
i , φi))
.
This naturally extends to inﬁnite state machines with N replacing Qki in this equation and
in the deﬁnition of action counts cki of equation (4). The resulting inﬁnite product is no
cause for alarm. With a ﬁnite amount of data, the counts cki will be non-zero only for a ﬁnite
number of values q ∈ N, and thus only a ﬁnite number of factors will take on values other
than 1.
We are now ready to describe the proposal distribution, which is designed to favor ma-
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chines with higher degrees of ﬁt. We have the following probability mass function for λki :
h(λk∗i |Ki, Qk∗i , φki , ei) =
∏
(a,q)∈A×Qk∗i
h(λk∗i (a, q)|L((a, q)−), Ki, Qk∗i , φki , ei),
where
h(λk∗i (a, q)|L((a, q)−), Ki, Qk∗i , φki , ei) ∝⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∞ λk∗i = q + 1, a = |A|, max(a′,q′)<(a,q) λk∗i (a′, q′) = q
f(eki |Qki , λ¯L(a,q), φi) λk∗i ∈ {1, . . . ,max(a′,q′)<(a,q) λk∗i (a′, q′) + 1}
0 otherwise.
The value ∞ forces us to choose λk∗i = q + 1 if otherwise the resulting machine would
have unreachable states. The support {1, . . . ,max(a′,q′)<(a,q) λk∗i (a′, q′) + 1} ensures that the
non-initial states are correctly ordered.
For every k ∈ K, we draw Qk∗i and λk∗i as described above, and accept with probability
min
⎡
⎢⎣1, h(λki |Ki, Qki , φi, ei)
h(λk∗i |Ki, Qk∗i , φi, ei)
· θQki
θQk∗i
· [Γ(ν)]
|Ai|(|Qk∗i |−|Qki |)
[Γ(ν|Ai|)]|Qk∗i |−|Qki |
·
∏
q∈Qk∗i
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν+c
k∗
i (ai,q;λ
k∗
i ,φi))
∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν+c
k∗
i (ai,q;λ
k∗
i ,φi))∏
q∈Qki
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν+c
k
i (ai,q;λ
k
i ,φi))
∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν+c
k
i (ai,q;λ
k
i ,φi))
⎤
⎥⎦ .
For given k ∈ Ki, block Bλ is a random walk Metropolis update which proposes a
λk∗i identical to λ
k
i except for a random mutation. The proposal consists of drawing a
random pair (a, q) from the uniform distribution on A × Qki , then drawing λk∗i (a, q) from
the uniform distribution on Qki \λki (a, q). For all pairs (a′, q′) ∈ (A × Qki )\{(a, q)}, we set
λk∗i (a
′, q′) = λki (a
′, q′). Then if necessary, we permute the non-initial states so that λk∗i
satisﬁes the order condition for non-initial states.
The proposal is a random walk on the space of transition functions satisfying condition
2 (order of non-initial states) but not necessarily 3 (no unreachable states). We accept the
proposal λk∗i with probability
min
⎡
⎢⎣1,
∏
q∈Qk∗i
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν+c
k∗
i (ai;q))
∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν+c
k∗
i (ai;q))∏
q∈Qki
Γ(
∑
ai∈Ai ν+c
k
i (ai;q))
∏
ai∈Ai Γ(ν+c
k
i (ai;q))
· 1Λ(A,Qki )(λ
k∗
i )
⎤
⎥⎦ .
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Note that the indicator function 1Λ(A,Qki ), which comes from the prior on λ
k
i , means we reject
any proposal with unreachable states.
A block drawing µki from its conditional posterior distribution
By (5), the density for µki |Ki, πi, Qki , λki , φi, ei is a product of independent Dirichlet distri-
butions. Block Bµ draws each µ
k
i directly from its Dirichlet distribution using standard
procedures.
3.6 Machine Type Identiﬁcation
In this section we discuss an identiﬁcation issue concerning machine type labels. Any per-
mutation of machine types of a population pi gives an observationally equivalent population.
So the population in the example of Section 2, where m1 is 85% grim trigger, m2 is 85%
tit-for-tat and their respective probabilities are π(1) = 0.6 and π(2) = 0.4, is observationally
equivalent to a population where m1 is 85% tit-for-tat, m2 is 85% grim trigger, π(1) = 0.4
and π(2) = 0.6.
Note that we have already resolved a similar issue with state labels: if we permute the
states of a regular state transition function we obtain a non-regular state transition function,
which the prior assigns zero probability. This is an example of identiﬁcation through labelling
restrictions, where the restriction is expressed by conditions 2 and 3 on λ.
The non-identiﬁcation of machine types is not always a problem. Many questions can
be answered without recourse to machine type identiﬁcation restrictions. The posterior
distribution of the number of machine states (a measure of complexity) of the machine to
which a particular subject is assigned can be obtained without such recourse.
Sometimes, however, it is convenient to introduce labelling restrictions. Suppose Si =
{1, 2, 3} is the set of subjects for player i and Ki = {1, 2} is the set of machine types for i.
With no labelling restrictions, we might infer that machine assignments (φi(1), φi(2), φi(3))
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Table 1: Example of Posterior Probabilities of Machine Assignments
Values of (φi(1), φi(2), φi(3)) Posterior Probability
(1,1,1), (2,2,2) 0.05
(1,1,2), (2,2,1) 0.05
(1,2,1), (2,1,2) 0.10
(1,2,2), (2,1,1) 0.30
have the posterior distribution given in Table 2.
Each row gives an equivalence class of two observationally equivalent machine assign-
ments. Symmetry requires their posterior probabilities to be equal, and this common proba-
bility is also tabulated. The partition of the subject set implied by the machine assignments
is important, not the label values.
We identify machine types by selecting one map from each equivalence class to represent
the class. If, for example, we choose the ﬁrst map of each row, we are labelling as machine
1 the machine to which subject 1 is assigned, and machine 2 as the other machine.
Alternatively, we can choose the high probability map (1, 2, 2) from the fourth row and
the three maps which diﬀer from it by only one subject assignment: (2, 2, 2), (1, 1, 2) and
(1, 2, 1). We can think of machine 1 as the machine to which subjects 2 and 3 tend to be
assigned and to which subject 1 tends not to be assigned. This kind of identiﬁcation is
useful if posterior probability is dominated by a “central” machine assignment, a few “close”
machine assignments, and the observationally equivalent machine assignments obtained by
permuting machine type labels.
We now make precise a identiﬁcation strategy based on this general idea. This strategy
involves a central machine assignment: φ¯i : S → Ki, which we describe how to obtain below.
Each class of observationally equivalent machine assignments is represented by the one closest
in Hamming distance to φ¯, with ties resolved using a lexicographic order. The Hamming
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distance between two machine assignment functions is the number of subjects for which their
values are not equal.
The central machine assignment φ¯i is a ﬁxed point satisfying
φ¯i(s) = argmax
k∈Ki
Pr[φi(s) = k|Ki, ei] for every s ∈ Si,
where the probabilities are computed after identifying machine types as described in the
previous paragraph.
3.7 Marginal Likelihood Computation
To compute the posterior mass function f(Ki|ei), it is useful to have the values f(ei|Ki) for
all Ki with positive prior probability, since we can then compute f(Ki|ei) using Bayes rule:
f(Ki|ei) = f(Ki)f(ei|Ki)∑∞
κ=1 Pr[Ki = κ]f(ei|Ki = κ)
.
We use the method of Gelfand and Dey to compute the values f(ei|Ki). We require a
properly normalized density function fˆ(πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei), resembling the posterior
density f(πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei). With M draws (πmi , (Qk,mi , λk,mi , µk,mi )k∈Ki)m∈{1,...,M}
simulated from the posterior distribution, we compute
gˆ =
1
M
M∑
m=1
fˆ(πmi , (Q
k,m
i , λ
k,m
i , µ
k,m
i )k∈Ki|Ki)
f(ei, πmi , (Q
k,m
i , λ
k,m
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki)
.
Provided that our Markov chain is ergodic and its invariant distribution is the posterior
distribution πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki , φi|Ki, ei, the sample mean gˆ converges almost surely to the
following population mean g:
g ≡ E
[
fˆ(πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei)
f(ei, πi, (Qki , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki)
|Ki, ei
]
=
1
f(ei|Ki) · E
[
fˆ(πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei)
f(πi, (Qki , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei)
|Ki, ei
]
. (9)
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The posterior expectation in (9) is the following integral over the parameter space Θ:
∫
Θ
fˆ(πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei)
f(πi, (Qki , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei)
· f(πi, (Qki , λki , µki )k∈Ki|Ki, ei) dν(ϑ)
=
∫
Θ
fˆ(πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei) dν(ϑ) = 1,
where ν is the appropriate measure. Therefore g is the reciprocal of the marginal likelihood
f(ei|Ki).
The choice of fˆ is important, since the error of approximation depends on the distribution
of the ratio fˆ/f . The ratio is bounded below by zero, so reducing the error of approximation
involves controlling the right tail of this distribution. Roughly speaking, fˆ should approxi-
mate f , but errors of understatement are less serious than errors of overstatement.
Our choice of fˆ is based on the central machine assignment functions φ¯i discussed in
Section 3.6:
fˆ(πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei)
= f(πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei, φi = φ¯i, |Qki | ≤ Q¯)
= f(πi|Ki, φi = φ¯i)
·
∏
k∈Ki
f(Qki , λ
k
i |φi = φ¯i, |Qki | ≤ Q¯, ei) · f(µki |Qki , λki , φi = φ¯i, ei)
Equation (3) gives the normalized density f(πi|Ki, φi = φ¯i) and equation (5) gives the
normalized densities f(µki |Qki , λki , φi = φ¯i, ei). Equation (7) gives a probability mass function
proportional to f(Qki , λ
k
i |φi = φ¯i, |Qki | ≤ Q¯, ei), but not the normalization constant. We
calculate this normalization constant numerically by summing over all machines with up
to Q¯ states. The choice of Q¯ reﬂects a tradeoﬀ. The computational cost of the summation
increases with Q¯. However, as Q¯ decreases, the variance of fˆ/f increases due to the increased
probability of the event fˆ/f = 0.
Note that the true posterior distribution πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, ei is a mixture of distribu-
tions πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, φi, ei, where the mixing distribution is φi|Ki, ei. One component
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of this mixture is πi, (Q
k
i , λ
k
i , µ
k
i )k∈Ki|Ki, φi = φ¯i, ei, which is proportional to fˆ on the region
where |Qki | ≤ Q¯. We see that the ratio gfˆ/f is bounded above by the reciprocal of the
probability Pr[φi = φ¯i, |Qki | < Q¯|Ki, ei]. In practice, we ﬁnd that the procedure for choosing
φ¯ described in Section 3.6, and a feasible choice Q¯ makes this probability fairly high, and we
obtain very satisfactory standard errors for marginal likelihoods.
4 Experimental Design and Procedures
The stage game we study is the well known Prisoner’s Dilemma. In our game the punishment
(mutual defection) payoﬀ is 60, the temptation (play d when the opponent plays C) is 180,
the sucker (play c when the opponent plays D) is 0, and the reward (play c when the opponent
plays C) is 90. Recall that both the unique stage-game equilibrium and sub-game perfect
equilibrium in the ﬁnitely repeated game (by backward induction) are mutual defection in
each round.
By the folk theorem, we know that in the indeﬁnitely repeated game cooperative equilibria
can arise via the threat that deviations oﬀ of the equilibrium path are punished forever by
defection. To compute the minimum discount factor required to achieve cooperation it is
suﬃcient to ensure that a one-period deviation is not proﬁtable:
∞∑
t=0
δt90 ≥ 180 +
∞∑
t=1
δt60.
Thus for any discount factor δ ≥ 0.75 cooperative equilibria exist. In our experiments we
simulated a discount factor of 0.80 by introducing a constant and independent probability
of continuing the repeated game after each stage game. We set the continuation probability
just above the threshold of 0.75 so that cooperation is possible but not necessarily obvious.
With a continuation probability of 0.80 the expected length of a supergame is ﬁve rounds,
thus it is possible to run laboratory experiments where we can observe many supergames.
In the experiments, subjects were randomly and anonymously paired to play twenty
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supergames of indeﬁnite length. After each supergame subjects were randomly matched
with a new opponent. The supergame lengths were determined in advance using the stated
distribution.5 Each subject experienced the same sequence of supergame lengths, which
mitigated any diﬀerences in behavior due to diﬀerent experiences with the random process.
Subjects were informed of this procedure (but not the outcome) in advance.
The subjects were seated at a computer terminal displaying the earnings table for a row
and a column player. All subjects viewed the game as if they were the row player. The
choices of each stage game were recorded at the bottom of the screen, along with a label
that identiﬁed each supergame, and subjects were able to review these data at any time. A
screen informed the subjects whenever a new pairing was about to begin.
Subjects took a brief quiz that indicated whether or not they understood the earnings
table, and whether or not they understood the constant and independent continuation prob-
ability. For the latter, speciﬁcally, they were asked what chances out of ten there would be
that a pairing would continue if it had already lasted 1, 5, 10, and 100 periods. The answer
in each case is eight and the sessions did not begin until all subjects correctly answered the
questions. Subjects correctly answering these questions should have a better understand-
ing regarding the stochastic process that governed the end of the supergames and less of a
tendency toward the gambler’s fallacy.
A total of 44 English-speaking university students in Montreal participated in four ex-
perimental sessions.6 The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree software
(Fischbacher 1999). The experiments were run in June and July, 2004, at the Bell Exper-
imental Laboratory for Commerce and Economics at the Centre for Research and Analysis
on Organizations. Subjects earned CAD $10.00 for showing up on time and participating
fully (which compensated for travel to the oﬀ-campus laboratory). Subjects averaged an
5 The random number generator and seed are available upon request. The minimum supergame length
was 1; the maximum supergame length was 25; the average was 4.975.
6 We use only the ﬁrst session here.
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additional CAD $18.27 during the experiment that lasted between one and one and a half
hours. To control for possible wealth eﬀects accumulating during the (on average) 100 de-
cisions made by each subject, they were paid for the sum of their earnings in a randomly
selected ﬁve supergames. Alternative opportunities for pay in Montreal for our subjects is
considered to be approximately CAD $8.00 per hour.
5 Results
5.1 Simulation Results
To illustrate our procedure, we generate artiﬁcial data by having machines from two pop-
ulations play Prisoner’s Dilemma against each other, and then show what features of the
original populations we can recover.
Population 1 is the population described in Section 2. Machine k = 1 is 85% grim trigger,
machine k = 2 is 85% tit-for-tat, and both are equally likely. Population i = 2 also has two
equally probable machines, both with a single state. Machine k = 1 is 60% defect and
machine k = 2 is 60% cooperate.
We have eight subjects from each population, and each subject from population i = 1
plays each subject from population i = 2 exactly once. Unlike in the experimental data, we
draw an independent supergame duration T for every pair of subjects. As with the experi-
mental data, T is exponential with mean 5, representing a constant continuation probability
of 0.8.
Rather than draw machine types randomly from the population, we “stratify” the sub-
jects so that there are four subjects of each machine type in both populations. Speciﬁcally,
we set φi(1) = φi(3) = φi(5) = φi(7) = 1 and φi(2) = φi(4) = φi(6) = φi(8) = 2 for
i ∈ {1, 2}.
We choose machines for population i = 1 whose deterministic counterparts (machines
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playing the probable state with probability one) are supported by equilibrium predictions
or past investigations of repeated games (e.g., Axelrod 1985). Population i = 2 machines
generate variation in play that reveals the machine types of population i = 1.
We choose the following prior parameters. We set α = 1, implying, for each Ki ∈ {1, 2, 3},
a uniform density for πi|Ki on the Ki-dimensional simplex. We set the priors for the numbers
of machines states and the numbers of machine types to be uniform on {1, 2, 3}. That is,
θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = 1/3 and θj = ωj = 0 for all j > 3. We set ν = 0.6, which
favors extreme action probabilities. The density for the 2-dimensional Dirichlet (i.e. the
Beta) distribution with parameter vector (0.6, 0.6) is shown in Figure 1.
We present results only for population i = 1, the more interesting case.
How well do we recover K1, the number of machines? The true value is 2, and we obtain
the posterior distribution (0.00, 0.23, 0.77) on {1, 2, 3}. We discover heterogeneity, but we
have diﬃculty learning whether or not there is a third machine type. Since we observe the
behavior of only 8 subjects, it is diﬃcult to know how many more than 2 of machine types
there are. Since the posterior probability Pr[K1 = 1|e1] is negligible, we discuss results
conditional only on K1 = 2 and K1 = 3. We can think of the whole posterior distribution as
being a mixture of the two conditional distributions, with the mixing weights 0.23 and 0.77.
How well do we recover φ1, the machine assignment function? We ﬁrst condition on
K1 = 2. Later, we will condition instead on K1 = 3. Only two partitions of subjects have
non-negligible posterior probability. The partition with subjects 1, 3, 5 and 7 assigned to
one machine and subjects 2, 4, 6 and 8 assigned to the other (which is the true partition)
has posterior probability 0.995. The partition with subjects 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 assigned to one
and subjects 4, 6 and 8 to the other has posterior probability 0.005. Clearly, we recover φ1
quite well. We classify all subjects correctly. We are nearly certain about our classiﬁcation
of all subjects except subject 2 and even for this subject, our classiﬁcation has posterior
probability 0.995.
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Figure 1: Density of Beta(0.6,0.6) distribution
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Table 2: Posterior probabilities Pr[φ1(s) = k|Ki = 3, ei]
Subject (s) k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
1 0.891 0.000 0.109
2 0.000 0.952 0.048
3 0.767 0.009 0.224
4 0.000 0.998 0.002
5 0.963 0.000 0.037
6 0.000 0.997 0.003
7 0.957 0.000 0.043
8 0.000 0.997 0.003
The central machine assignment, obtained using the method of Section 3.6, is φ¯1(1) =
φ¯1(3) = φ¯1(5) = φ¯1(7) = 1 and φ¯1(2) = φ¯1(4) = φ¯1(6) = φ¯1(8) = 2. The is exactly the
same as the true φ1, but note that it could just as easily have been φ¯1(1) = φ¯1(3) = φ¯1(5) =
φ¯1(7) = 2 and φ¯1(2) = φ¯1(4) = φ¯1(6) = φ¯1(8) = 1, in which case we would need to permute
the results below in the obvious way. According to the method of Section 3.6, we identify as
machine k = 1 the one with the highest count of subjects 1, 3, 5, and 7 assigned to it plus
subjects 2, 4, 6 and 8 not assigned to it. Machine k = 2 is the other one.
We now condition on K1 = 3. The central machine assignment is φ¯1(1) = φ¯1(3) =
φ¯1(5) = φ¯1(7) = 1 and φ¯1(2) = φ¯1(4) = φ¯1(6) = φ¯1(8) = 2, as before: φ¯ assigns no subject to
machine k = 3. This identiﬁes machine k = 1 as the one with the highest count of subjects
1, 3, 5, and 7 assigned to it plus subjects 2, 4, 6 and 8 not assigned to it; machine k = 2 as
the one with the highest count of subjects 2, 4, 6, and 8 assigned to it plus subjects 1, 3, 5
and 7 not assigned to it; and machine k = 3 as the remaining machine. Table 2 tabulates
the posterior probabilities of each assignment.
Results for the posterior distribution of π1, the machine probability mass function, are
somewhat misleading, since we did not draw from any distribution, but instead arranged
for equal proportions in the sample. Conditional on K1 = 2, we compute a posterior mean
(standard deviation) for π1(1), the probability that a random subject of population 1 is
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Table 3: Posterior probabilities Pr[Qk1 = Q|K1, e1] of machine state numbers
K1 k Q = 1 Q = 2 Q = 3
2 1 0.000 0.745 0.254
2 2 0.000 0.892 0.108
3 1 0.000 0.656 0.344
3 2 0.000 0.889 0.111
3 3 0.203 0.375 0.422
machine type 1, of 0.50 (0.15). The relative uncertainty reﬂects the fact that we only observe
eight subjects from the population. Conditional on K1 = 3, we have a posterior mean for
(π1(1), π1(2), π1(3)) of (0.416, 0.451, 0.133).
How well do we recover numbers of states? The true values for both machines is 2. The
posterior distribution of machine state numbers is given in Table 3. Given K1 = 2, we
are all but certain that machine k = 1 has memory, but still somewhat unsure of the exact
complexity. We are nearly sure that machine k = 2 also has memory, and somewhat more
conﬁdent that there are only 2 states. For K1 = 3, the distributions for machines k = 1 and
k = 2 change slightly. Since no subject is assigned to machine k = 3 with much probability,
we learn little about it: the posterior distribution of its number of states is close to the
(uniform) prior. If we further condition on at least one of the eight subjects being assigned
to it, the probability that the machine has one state drops almost to zero.
Finally, how well do we recover the state transition functions and action probability
mass functions? Once again, we ﬁrst condition on K1 = 2. Machine k = 1 has the exact
state transition function of its true value (grim trigger transitions) with posterior probability
0.892. If it does have this transition function, the cooperate probability in the initial state
has a posterior mean (standard deviation) of 0.876 (0.026), and the defect probability in the
other state has a posterior mean (standard deviation) of 0.864 (0.039). Recall that both true
values are 0.85. No other transition function has posterior probability greater than 0.02.
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The prior probability of each of the 240 unique 2-state transition functions is 0.00139.
Machine k = 2 has exact tit-for-tat transitions (the true transitions) with probability
0.892. With this transition function, the cooperate probability in the initial state has a
posterior mean (standard deviation) of 0.863 (0.049), and the defect probability in the other
state has a posterior mean (standard deviation) of 0.865 (0.135). No other transition function
has probability greater than 0.02.
Now we condition on K1 = 3. Machine k = 1 has exact grim trigger transitions with
posterior probability 0.589. With this transition function, the cooperate probability in the
initial state has a posterior mean (standard deviation) of 0.865 (0.037), and the defect
probability in the other state has a posterior mean (standard deviation) of 0.857 (0.134).
With another 0.058 probability, the transition function for machine k = 1 is like grim trigger
except that the machine returns to the initial state if it cooperates against a defecting
opponent. Since cooperating in this state is the unlikely action, we have less data informing
us about this state transition than we have informing us about other transitions. No other
transition function has posterior probability greater than 0.02.
Machine k = 2 has exact tit-for-tat transitions with posterior probability 0.886. With
this transition function, the cooperate probability in the initial state has a posterior mean
(standard deviation) of 0.875 (0.027), and the defect probability in the other state has
a posterior mean (standard deviation) of 0.869 (0.131). No other transition function has
posterior probability greater than 0.02.
Machine k = 3 has probability 0.203 of having 1 state and therefore no non-degenerate
transitions, probability 0.034 of having exact grim trigger transitions, probability 0.026 of
having the same near-grim-trigger transitions as above and probability 0.015 of having exact
tit-for-tat transitions. No other transition function has posterior probability greater than
0.02.
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5.2 Experimental Results
We use the same prior for inferring populations from experimental data. Because of the
symmetry of the game, we treat all experimental subjects as being from population 1.
The posterior distribution, on {1, 2, 3}, for the number of machines K1 is (0.00, 0.28, 0.72).
We are nearly certain that there is heterogeneity, but less sure about the degree. Given the
small number of subjects, this is understandable. Again and for the same reasons, we ignore
the case K1 = 1 and treat the cases K1 = 2 and K1 = 3 separately.
The central machine assignment given K1 = 2 is
φ¯1(1) = φ¯1(2) = φ¯1(3) = φ¯1(4) = φ¯1(5) = 1 φ¯1(6) = φ¯1(7) = φ¯1(8) = 2,
which establishes machine k = 1 as the machine associated with subjects 1 through 5 and
machine k = 2 as the machine associated with subjects 6 through 8. The central machine
assignment given K1 = 3 is
φ¯1(1) = φ¯1(2) = φ¯1(3) = φ¯1(4) = φ¯1(5) = 2 φ¯1(6) = φ¯1(7) = φ¯1(8) = 3,
with no subjects assigned to machine k = 1. We see that machine k = 2 tends to be assigned
the same subjects as machine k = 1 for K1 = 2, and machine k = 3 tends to be assigned
the same subjects as machine k = 2 for K1 = 2. Table 4 tabulates posterior probabilities
of assignments for both K1 = 2 and K1 = 3. Some of the features of the joint distribution
are obscured by reporting only these marginal distributions. For example, the assignments
of subjects 1 and 3 are highly correlated. If one is assigned the “5 through 8” machine, then
the other is more likely to be so assigned.
For the posterior mean of machine type probabilities, we have E[(π(1), π(2)|K1 = 2, e1]
= (0.609, 0.391) and E[(π(1), π(2), π(3)|K1 = 2, e1] = (0.117, 0.528, 0.355).
The posterior distribution of machine state numbers is given in Table 5. As with the
simulated data, we are quite sure that all machines have memory. Again we have a machine,
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Table 4: Posterior probabilities Pr[φ1(s) = k|Ki, ei] of state assignments
K1 Subject (s) k = 1 k = 2
2 1 0.965 0.035
2 2 1.000 0.000
2 3 0.970 0.030
2 4 1.000 0.000
2 5 1.000 0.000
2 6 0.000 1.000
2 7 0.000 1.000
2 8 0.153 0.847
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
3 1 0.040 0.887 0.073
3 2 0.058 0.942 0.000
3 3 0.038 0.897 0.065
3 4 0.017 0.982 0.001
3 5 0.078 0.922 0.000
3 6 0.016 0.000 0.984
3 7 0.004 0.001 0.995
3 8 0.035 0.182 0.783
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Table 5: Posterior probabilities Pr[Qk1 = Q|K1, e1] of state numbers
K1 k Q = 1 Q = 2 Q = 3
2 1 0.000 0.000 1.000
2 2 0.000 0.538 0.461
3 1 0.254 0.319 0.426
3 2 0.000 0.002 0.998
3 3 0.000 0.516 0.484
this time k = 1, having a low probability of any subject being assigned to it. As before, the
posterior distribution of its number of states diﬀers little from the prior distribution, but
conditioning on some subject being assigned to it, the probability of having only one state
drops to nearly zero.
Given K1 = 2, several state transition functions have posterior probability greater than
0.02. High probability transition functions for k = 1 come in three clusters, illustrated in
Table 6. Entries in the table give either the state value in {1, 2, 3} or an X indicating a “don’t
care”. A cluster in the table consists of all transition functions obtained by independently
assigning values to the don’t cares.
Cluster 1 consists of nine transition functions that agree on all transitions except λ((c, C), 2)
and λ((d,D), 3). The posterior probabilities of the nine transition functions in cluster 1 range
from 0.056 to 0.060, and together account for 0.525 of posterior probability. Numerical stan-
dard errors suggest that these probabilities are diﬀerent and not due to numerical sampling
error, but this is not conclusive. Cluster 2 consists of three transition functions that agree
on all transitions except λ((d,D), 3). Their posterior probabilities range from 0.028 to 0.029
and together account for 0.086 of posterior probability. Cluster 3 consists of nine more tran-
sition functions, with probabilities ranging from 0.024 to 0.026 and accounting for a posterior
probability of 0.224.
The three clusters together account for 0.835 of posterior probability. The 21 high prob-
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ability transition functions, like all 343,000 state transition functions with three states, each
have a prior probability of 9.71× 10−7.
Not only are the transition functions in each cluster very similar, the clusters themselves
are quite similar. All 21 high probability transition functions agree on eight of the twelve
transitions, including all four transitions from the initial state.
The action probability mass functions associated with these 21 high probability transi-
tion functions are very similar. The posterior mean (standard deviation) of the cooperate
probability is approximately 0.42 (0.05) in the initial state, 0.03 (0.01) in state 2 and 0.95
(0.03) in state 3.
The k = 1 machine exhibits at least three interesting behavioral characteristics. First,
it is complex, consisting of three states. Second, it has a buﬀer state (state 1) that delays
entering the defect state (2) after a defection is observed and the cooperative state (3) after
cooperation is observed. This state might be thought of as a cautious state: the machine
does not always immediately punish a defection, but sometimes waits for a second consec-
utive defection before punishing. Likewise, the machine sometimes waits for a second act
of cooperation before starting to cooperate itself. Second, it exhibits reciprocity, a feature
for which there is much experimental evidence (e.g., Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). Third, co-
operative actions result in cooperative responses with high probability, and non-cooperative
actions are likely to engender non-cooperative actions.
High probability transition functions for k = 2 come in one cluster, illustrated in Table
7. The cluster consists of 16 transition functions, which agree on 4 transition functions
and diﬀer on the other 4. The cluster includes the tit-for-tat but not the grim trigger
transition function. Their probabilities range from 0.030 to 0.033 and together account for
0.495 of posterior probability. The action probability mass functions associated with these
16 high probability transition functions are again very similar. The posterior mean (standard
deviation) of the cooperate probability is approximately 0.02 (0.01) in the initial state, and
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Table 6: Three high probability clusters for machine k = 1
Cluster Action (a) λ(a, 1) λ(a, 2) λ(a, 3)
(d,D) 2 2 X
1 (c,D) 2 2 1
(d, C) 3 1 3
(c, C) 3 X 3
(d,D) 2 2 X
2 (c,D) 2 2 2
(d, C) 3 1 3
(c, C) 3 3 3
(d,D) 2 2 X
3 (c,D) 2 2 1
(d, C) 3 1 1
(c, C) 3 X 3
Table 7: One high probability cluster for machine k = 1
Action (a) λ(a, 1) λ(a, 2)
(d,D) 1 X
(c,D) X 1
(d, C) 2 X
(c, C) 2 X
0.98 (0.03) in the other. Note that in the initial state, defection is the high probability
action. Usually the initial state in a tit-for-tat machine is thought of as a cooperate state.
Machines k = 1 and k = 2 both have, with high posterior probability, a tit-for-tat quality
of imitating the opponent’s action in the previous period.
We don’t report results conditional on K1 = 3 except to point out that machine k = 2 is
very similar to the k = 1 machine for K1 = 2 and machine k = 3 is very similar to the k = 2
machine for K1 = 2.
38
6 Conclusions
We presented a new method to draw inference about the number and types of repeated-game
strategies from choice data in experiments. We base our strategy model on ﬁnite automata,
which model a broad array of strategic behavior.
We demonstrated our ability to recover features of machines, commonly found in repeated
game theory, that generate artiﬁcial data. We generated an amount of data similar to what
we might expect to collect in the laboratory. We showed that our procedure does well
recovering the characteristics of the underlying machines. We applied our procedure to new
experiments in which subjects simply played many indeﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
games. The repeated game admits both cooperative and noncooperative equilibria.
The results give us a new picture of play in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. We ﬁnd
strong evidence for heterogeneity. We ﬁnd evidence that people use strategies that punish
and reward behavior of the opponent. And interestingly, the strategies we infer do not
contain harsh enough punishments to support cooperation in equilibrium.
Our strategy model and inference procedure open doors for new avenues of investigation
of play in repeated games. For example, we can study equilibrium selection in a new (and
more natural) way by examining the expected payoﬀ of inferred strategies when played
against the population, and comparing this to the expected payoﬀ for the best-response to
the inferred population. And we are currently examining empirically based strategy models
across several diﬀerent types of stage games in an eﬀort to discover behavioral regularities
between them.
For another example, with the ability to base repeated-game strategies on empirical
observation we are poised for fresh contributions to the literature on learning in games
(Camerer and Ho, 1999; Cheung and Friedman, 1997; Erev and Roth, 1998), in which
boundedly rational learning models are employed to understand and predict play over time
(much longer periods of time than the in the supergames in our experiments). These dynamic
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models of behavior assume that subjects make choices from a set of strategies that typically
contains only stage-game actions. However, it seems likely that subjects are learning to
play repeated-game strategies. We should be able to augment the learning models with the
repeated-game strategies we recover using our procedure, thus broadening the class of games
to which the learning theories are applicable, and improving our predictions of strategic
choice behavior in dynamic environments.
Our strategy model is quite general; it can be applied to games with multiple actions
and player types, and it contains both equilibrium and non-equilibrium strategies. As such
we aim to make our procedure available as a tool to a least compliment existing methods of
statistical inference for a wide class of games. With our procedure we take a step toward a
deeper understanding of the ghost in repeated-game machine.
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